Indianapolis by Vincent & Vladic

Ref: Vincent & Vladic (2018). Indianapolis. Simon & Schuster. 

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Summary

• USS Indianapolis: The flagship of the WWII Pacific fleet; she carried 3x 250-ton turrets, each hefting 3x 8” guns that could reach out 18 miles.  

• IJN I-58: A submarine used in WWII by the IJN to attack Allied shipping, merchant or man-o’-war. She was armed with the lethal Type 95 torpedo, that used highly compressed O as a fuel oxidizer. This increased the torpedo’s range to nearly triple that of standard US torpedoes, while nearly eliminating any telltale air-bubble wake. The I-58 was responsible for the sinking of the USS Indianapolis under commander Hashimoto. 

• The sinking of Indianapolis was second only to Pearl Harbor as the Navy’s greatest loss in World War II. In total, 67 officers and 812 enlisted men (879 total) were reported MIA. 

• “I was in command of the ship, and I am responsible for its fate. I hope they make their decisions soon and do what they want to with me.”-USS Indianapolis CAPT McVay. 

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Atomic Bomb

• Japan’s preparations surprised US planners with their speed and intensity. The Empire had built defenses and amassed forces at Kyushu four times greater than predicted and in far less time. The manpower level for Japan’s ground armies was approaching 375,000, with a confirmed total of 11 combat divisions and two depot divisions to be in place by month’s end. This force was only expected to grow. 

• Army signals intelligence revealed that Japan had accurately guessed America’s three planned mainland invasion points on the island of Kyushu. Defenses were pouring in so rapidly that Empire defenders would soon outnumber the invasion force. 

• In the final calculus, the president had decided that as terrible as it was, the bomb might have the power to prevent an invasion that would surely be more terrible than the fight for that small, rocky island. Okinawa had cost America dearly: 36 ships sunk, 368 damaged, 763 aircraft lost, > 12,000 soldiers, sailors, and Marines dead, drowned, or missing. More than 34,000 men were wounded, plus an additional 26,000 nonbattle casualties, primarily cases of combat fatigue, or “shell shock.” The cost to Japan was even higher: more than 100,000 Japanese fighters died, as well as up to 140,000 civilians—nearly half the island’s estimated prewar population. The death toll underscored Truman’s opinion that this enemy would never surrender—would risk total annihilation rather than admit defeat…Even Nimitz, who had favored a homeland invasion as late as April, changed his position amid soaring Okinawa losses. He now supported using the bomb. Intelligence reports of thousands of kamikaze planes and suicide boats being assembled for the defense of the Japanese home island of Kyushu reinforced his new position. 

• “OPERATED ON THIS MORNING. DIAGNOSIS NOT YET COMPLETE BUT RESULTS SEEM SATISFACTORY AND ALREADY EXCEED EXPECTATIONS. (Translation: The Trinity test was successful).”-Stimson to POTUS Truman.

• “(During the delivery of U-235 for Little Boy from San Fran to Tinian) the Indianapolis broke the speed record for the 2,091-mile passage from Farallon Light off San Francisco to Diamond Head—the whole voyage in 74.5 hours.”

• Little Boy

• General Groves felt air transport more inherently risky than sea, so the U-235 projectile for Little Boy was sent to Tinian aboard the Indianapolis. 

• Parsons’s primary assignment was the assembly of the gun-type U bomb. He would complete that job inside the belly of the Enola Gay, the B-29 Superfortress of the 509th Composite Bomber Squadron that would deliver the bomb to its target. Because B-29s had a proclivity for crashing on takeoff, and because the U bomb was so dangerous, Groves decided that the “gadget,” as they called it, must be assembled in the air. 

• The Enola Gay’s pilot, Colonel Paul Tibbets, Jr., had named the plane after his mother, Enola Gay. 

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Guam (Prior to Sinking)

• Jul, 1945: The USS Indianapolis transports the U-235 for Little Boy from San Francisco to Tinian, refuels in Guam and is sunk enroute Leyte by IJN I-58 on Route Peddie. 

• Route Peddie: An 1100-mile straight route from Guam to Leyte across the Philippine Sea. The route misses a due-west heading by just eight degrees. 

• Commodore Carter served as Nimitz’s assistant chief of staff and operations officer, but McVay knew him as “Jimmy.” When McVay appeared in his office, the two had a casual conversation. McVay explained that he had been out of the fight since Okinawa and asked Carter to catch him up on the operational situation. “Things are very quiet,” Carter said. He did not mention, either directly or in sanitized fashion, the ULTRA intelligence on the deployment of four IJN submarines on offensive missions to the Philippine Sea. Neither did he mention that one, and possibly two, of those subs sank Underhill. Or that Admiral King’s magicians had pinned I-58 to their maps five hundred miles north of what they suspected was Palau, near the Allied shipping lanes that crisscrossed the Philippine Sea between the Marianas, the Carolines, and the Philippines. Instead, Carter said, “The Japs are on their last legs and there’s nothing to worry about.” 

• McVay remarked he would prefer to travel in company with another ship. He had never felt that a ship without underwater sound detection equipment should travel alone, but sometimes escorts weren’t available and a skipper had to accept the risk…The routing officer told McVay he would not be afforded an escort…After McVay was gone, Waldron called the offices of Captain Oliver Naquin, surface operations officer for Guam, to see whether an escort was available. Waldron was told that no escort was necessary. Given Indianapolis’s size and number of personnel, Waldron was a little surprised, and he said as much to Northover, adding, “At least we went through the motions.” 

• 0910, 28 Jul, 1945: The USS Indianapolis weighs anchor from Guam enroute Luzon via Route Peddie. 

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Sinking

• ~0010, 30 Jul, 1945: The USS Indianapolis, traveling at 12kts on course 260 enroute Luzon from Guam, is struck by two Type 95 torpedoes fired from IJN I-58 submarine at range 3000yds commanded by Hashimoto on Route Peddie. Hashimoto’s first torpedo rams Indy’s starboard bow just below the forward 20 mm antiaircraft guns, igniting the aviation fuel stores and incinerating or severely burning anyone belowdecks in the forward part of the ship. The blast rips away between frames 12 and 13, the bow clung to the keel of the ship like a hangnail, held there by only a few threads of hull plating. Two seconds later, the second torpedo explodes below the waterline near frame 45, missing Indy’s armory belt by just a few frames. The twin blasts and water cavity effects rupture the hull, tears open the thin outer strakes, and opens the ship to the sea. With the bow sheared off, and the propellers still pushing the ship forward, the honeycomb of exposed passageways and compartments funneled the sea into the interior of the ship. A wall of seawater surged in, drowning the men immediately behind frame 12. The main and second decks continued flooding fast, and fuel oil floated atop the seawater. Only 12 minutes later, Indy sunk beneath the sea. Men were deposited in the 80-degree water some 280 miles from the nearest land singly and in groups, over one to two miles on her heading of 260 degrees with ~300-400 of the 800 or so initial survivors coalescing into one large group.

• Driscoll, a young officer who’d been aboard for less than a year, did not send the ship’s position with Sturtevant. 

• A crew member asked Hashimoto whether, once back on the surface, he would allow the crew to attack any enemy survivors. “No,” Hashimoto replied. “We have already done our job.” 

• After landing his plane at Harman Field on Guam, LeFrancis caught a ride over to the Navy end of the island and tracked down a commander. He described the events of the night before, adding that the general thought he’d seen the ship firing back. The Navy commander told LeFrancis that he was unaware of any gunnery practice scheduled for that area, and that LeFrancis and the general had probably not seen the kind of action LeFrancis described. 

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Afloat

30 Jul, 1945 (Monday)

• Parke organized the large group of floaters into one great mass. Each man put his arms through the life jacket of the man in front of him so that back to front, the group formed a large ring. The injured, and those without life jackets, were put in the center where Haynes and Modisher could look after them. At first light, Parke took stock of the group’s resources, which, apart from life jackets, consisted of a single line of rope, about a hundred feet long. Though the seas were calm, rolling swells and shifting currents threatened to drag the group apart. Parke ordered the men to shape the line into a ring. Those with life jackets were to tie themselves to the line, and those without jackets were to hang on. The procedure was simple, but it kept the men together and gave them something to focus on, a strategy that would prove to save lives. 

• Harpo Celaya’s group had swelled in the night to >100 men. At least two more rafts and two floater nets had joined the flotilla, and now he hung on to his line and watched a bizarre carousel of desperation: castaways crabbed over the rafts and nets in swarms, swamping them until they dumped everyone and sank, only to pop to the surface again. The process then repeated. Finally, Chief Clarence Benton swam forward to short-circuit the chaos. “All right, everyone off the rafts unless you’re injured or without a life jacket. Everyone else can hang on to the sides.” LT Richard Redmayne was the senior officer, but with everyone disguised in fuel oil, he did not declare himself. 

• Three separate groups—Richard Redmayne’s, Glenn Morgan’s, and Felton Outland’s—would form around three different quartets of rafts with varying numbers of attendant floater nets. Several groups of raftless swimmers formed as well, some with floater nets, some with only the life jackets on their backs. The largest group with only life jackets was the one that included Haynes, Woolston, Conway, and Parke. But over the coming days, more than a hundred men would drift away from the Haynes group to join others, or form their own. 

• Ed Harrell’s swimmer group floated among those toward the north. With the sun full up, Harrell could see that about a third of the men in his group had died during the night. He and others removed their dog tags and vests and relinquished their bodies to the deep. But many of the dead refused to leave, and soon the 50 or 60 men still living found themselves swimming with a school of corpses. By contrast, the McVay group, among those toward the SW edge of the survivor map, enjoyed a relative oasis. They had connected with another raft and floater net bearing five more men, bringing McVay’s castaway crew to a total of nine souls. Also, the men found on their rafts two good paddles, a flare pistol with a dozen flares, and a large sheet of canvas. There was a box of matches, too, but it had soaked through, rendering the contents mostly useless. They also salvaged some tubes of ointment and a few morphine syrettes from an emergency kit that was otherwise ruined. 

• As Monday wore on, the McVay group floated near an emergency rations can and scooped it aboard. Food! Beautifully packed, with a double tin top to prevent water from seeping in, it contained several cans of Hormel Spam, along with malted milk tablets and tins of biscuits. McVay looked over the rations and did some quick math. “I will open one Hormel tin per day,” he announced, adding that he would divide the 12 oz evenly. He also calculated that each man could have two malted milk tablets and two biscuits per day. Rationed this way, he thought the provisions could last up to ten days. 

• Scores of sharks cycloned in water columns that were clear as crystal for at least 50’ before receding into sapphire. Many were likely oceanic whitetips, the most common ship-following shark and considered the most dangerous shark of all. The Japanese called them yogore, the word an assembly of kanji characters that convey the ideas of “pollute,” “defile,” and “rape.” 

• The intercept was one of about five hundred processed that day. Without a vessel type or location of the alleged sinking, there wasn’t much to go on. 

• On July 30, Commander Amphibious Forces Pacific (COMPHIBSPAC) tried to raise Indianapolis for a planned test of the ship’s new radio teletype equipment. When the test failed, COMPHIBSPAC asked for a relay through Radio Guam. That test also failed, prompting COMPHIBSPAC to notify CincPac Advance that radio checks would be discontinued until Indianapolis advised that she was ready for further tests. 

31 Jul, 1945 (Tuesday)

• All the seawater drinkers died painful deaths. A lack of fluid intake increased salt levels in their bodies, triggering the natural response of greater thirst. When they took in no fluid to decrease salt levels, water rushed out from their cells to do the job. Brain cells tore loose from their rightful locations, impairing judgment just enough to cause the men to seek poisonous relief. Thirst begged their hands to administer water to dilute the salt that was poisoning their bodies. They obliged with seawater, introducing more salt and increasing their thirst to the point of mindless lust. Blood vessels tore and fluid built up in the brain, causing seizures and insanity. They vomited and foamed at the mouth. Some died of kidney failure. Others’ brains short-circuited violently, as when a tree branch hits a high voltage power line. 

1 Aug, 1945 (Wednesday)

• By Wednesday morning, Harrell’s group had fallen from 80 to 17 souls. 

• At Leyte, the surface operations officer, CAPT Alfred Granum, learned that Indy should have arrived three days ago and had not. 

2 Aug, 1945 (Thursday)

• Groups composed primarily of rafts now formed the leading edge of a motley survivor convoy that continued its W-SW drift. Though Marks didn’t know it, these groups had now blown 18-20 miles south of Route Peddie, and nearly 8 miles from the sinking site. At the opposite end of the oily residue, 30-40 miles NE, the swimmers and those less exposed to the wind formed the tail end of the troupe. These men remained nearly on Route Peddie, but about 40-50 miles from where they began their slow journey. 

• Haynes Group: Without rafts and formed the NE end of the line. 

• Redmayne’s Group: A loosely assembled paddy of rafts and floater nets in the center group. 

• McVay’s Group: A 5 raft flotilla. 

• Blum’s Group: Started with ~200 and 4 rafts and dwindled to ~40. 

• Insane with thirst, a man in his division used a knife to cut the throat of another sailor and drink his blood. Then Gibson saw another man cut someone’s wrist. “Look!” someone yelled. “He’s eating his arm!” 

• A few of the men carried 5” utility knives. They agreed that head-locking a man and inserting the knife into the flesh under his armpit would be the most humane way to kill a friend. After making the pact, this small group of men agonized as they played judge, jury, and executioner for shipmates who descended into delirium. When a man cried out “Dirty Jap!” or “Shark!” and launched himself at another, the respected coxswain or another man took his knife and performed the coup de grâce. 

• Lebow & Hershberger’s Group: Started with ~130 men and dwindled to 35. 

• Cox’s Group: Started with ~30 men and dwindles to ~10.  

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Rescue

• What were the chances that the Ventura would fly directly over the survivors? From a normal sector-search altitude, the head of a man floating in the water would be less than a speck, as undetectable as the diameter of the cross-section of a human hair seen endwise from across a room. In a word, invisible.

• During the rescue, a seaman had called out, “Look at that fish!” The sailor had spotted a shark. But “fish” is also Navy slang for “torpedo.” Theriault, who had parked his ship where another had possibly just been torpedoed and sunk, lunged for the engine-order telegraph and dialed it to all-ahead full. “Get the LCVPs aboard!” he yelled. “Let’s get the hell out of here!” The engine room was about to comply when another officer reset the telegraph, canceling Theriault’s order. “No way,” the officer said. “We’re going to stay here until we get every survivor aboard.” Theriault repeated his order. Bassett was to leave the area immediately. But the other officers physically blocked the skipper’s path to the fantail, where the rescue effort was being coordinated, and gave him only one open avenue: to his quarters. 

• Each man in the McVay group climbed the Ringness cargo net under his own power. 

• USS Doyle: Rescued 93 men, including those from the 2x Dumbo planes. 

• The USS Doyle captain had resolutely trained his searchlight at the sky. when he (a survivor) saw Doyle’s beacon, it was as though a light switched on in heaven. Around him, fresh fire surged in the men, a sudden, burning will to live. 

• USS Register: Rescued 12 men. 

• USS Dufilho: Rescued a single lone survivor, PO2 Francis Rineay. 

• USS Ralph Talbot: Rescued 24 men. 

• When Indy was hit, had she been zigzagging? Under the standing orders, it was possible that LT Orr, Indianapolis’s OOD, had recommenced zigzagging. But McVay couldn’t be sure—he had been asleep. If conditions necessitated zigzagging, McVay was sure Orr would have ordered it done without hesitation. But there were some officers who would initiate zigzagging then go inform the captain, and others who would inform the captain first. McVay could not be sure which kind Orr was—or had been, if he was among the dead. In any case, he felt the responsibility lay with himself. The two men discussed it at length. Finally, McVay agreed to Meyer’s draft message. It included the lat/long where McVay’s group was rescued, the number of total survivors aboard Ringness, the suspected cause of the sinking, and the fact that Indianapolis had not been steering a zigzag course. 

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Court of Inquiry (Aug, 1945)

• Fleet Admiral Ernest King ordered that Charles McVay III stand trial for the loss of Indianapolis…By bringing McVay to trial immediately, King could ensure that the admirals’ testimony, not slated for completion until mid-December, would never reach the public ear. In addition, he could prevent the introduction of potentially mitigating and even exonerating testimony, improving the odds of a guilty verdict. Whether either of these was King’s aim remains unclear, but by pushing the court-martial ahead, he would achieve both. 

• Nimitz appointed to the court VADM George Murray, commander of the Marianas Islands. The proceedings were to take place in Murray’s offices at Guam. It could be argued that Murray, as the divert authority east of the Chop line, had an inherent conflict of interest. But rescue efforts had wrapped up only four days earlier and the circumstances of the sinking were still murky. No one was yet talking about the implications of the hunter-killer operation conducted by USS Harris. No one was talking about the positively identified submarine she had chased for a dozen hours dead ahead of Indianapolis. No one was talking about any responsibility that might lie with Murray for not having diverted Indianapolis, or even alerted McVay to the storm of message traffic that warned of a protracted antisubmarine chase in his path. 

• 13-15 Aug, 1945: Admiral Charles Lockwood convenes the Nimitz-ordered court of inquiry on the sinking of the USS Indianapolis. 

• The court asked if the ship had been on a zigzag course, to which McVay replied, “No, sir.” McVay noted that the night had been dark and visibility poor, and that no intelligence was given to him about any submarine threat. McVay’s routing orders permitted him to cease zigzagging and steer a straight course under such conditions. But under questioning, he had to admit that his standing orders for the OOD did not include a directive to start zigzagging if conditions improved. 

• The court asked Naquin, “Would you judge that the estimate of submarine dangers along the route from Guam to Leyte at the time of the sailing of Indianapolis was considered to be heavy or light? . . . particularly precarious or nominal?” “I would consider the calculated risk as practically negligible,” Naquin said. 

• Philippine Sea Frontier operations officer Captain Alfred Granum said his officers assumed that Indy had arrived but did not check to be sure. Granum blamed this on 10CL-45, the governing policy on reporting the arrival of combatant ships. The policy, issued in January 1945, stated that “arrival reports shall not be made for combatant ships.” 

• The court concluded that the primary reason for the delay in reporting the ship missing was “the failure or inability of the ship to transmit a distress message.” This, in effect, blamed Indianapolis herself for the agony the delay would visit on the men in the water, despite the damage to the radio gear that the court itself acknowledged. 

• McVay’s decision to allow his OOD, McKissick, discretion about whether to steer a zigzag course. Number 35 in the “Opinions” section stated that while the court had yet to establish it conclusively, its opinion was that Indianapolis had been torpedoed. This was coupled with the court’s opinion that despite conflicting testimony, visibility was good with intermittent moonlight, and McVay’s failure to zigzag was a contributory cause of the loss of the ship. “This opinion, however, cannot be given full weight,” the court wrote, because the enemy had radar, “making an accurate attack relatively simple, whether a ship is zigzagging or not.” 

• They recommended to Nimitz that McVay be brought to trial by general court-martial for “culpable inefficiency in the performance of his duty” and “negligently endangering the lives of others.” 

• Fleet Admiral King was not happy. The Guam court of inquiry had failed, he believed. Too few witnesses called, too little evidence uncovered, too many questions unanswered. Why was Indianapolis proceeding unescorted? he wanted to know. Why was Route Peddie chosen? Were there alternative routes? Why were no escorts available, and if available, why were they not provided? And what responsible officer made the decision either way? In fact, King found the entire court of inquiry inadequate in both scope and discovery. That notwithstanding, he felt there was plenty of blame to go around. The ship was not up to snuff with regard to interior discipline, organization, and administration, King believed. At Leyte, LT Stuart Gibson should have taken intelligent action when he noticed Indianapolis overdue. Instead, he did nothing. CMDRE Carter’s confidential letter prohibiting arrival messages for combatant ships was clearly faulty and a primary reason for the delay in reporting Indianapolis overdue. There were more contributors to the disaster, including Gibson’s superior, LCDR Jules Sancho, who was ultimately responsible for Gibson’s actions on his watch, as well as Rear Admiral McCormick’s communications staff with their garbled decoding of Indy’s departure message. And yet, in his view, none of this excused CAPT Charles McVay. This put King at direct odds with his Pacific Fleet commander, Chester Nimitz. After reviewing the results of the Guam court of inquiry, Nimitz said he viewed McVay’s failure to zigzag as an error in judgment, but not one that scaled the heights of culpable negligence. King did not agree. At this point, the fleet admiral was looking at the loss of two warships—Underhill and Indianapolis—both torpedoed in the closing days of the war due to the same failure to put ULTRA intel to tactical use, with a total loss of >1000 men. 

• On 25 Sep, King fired off an acerbic five-page memo to Forrestal. It contained two recommendations. First, that Forrestal launch an investigation into the routing of Indianapolis and the garbled receipt of her departure message by Rear Admiral McCormick’s task group. And second, that CAPT Charles McVay be tried by general court-martial. 

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Supplemental Investigation (Oct- Nov, 1945)

• 31 Oct, 1945: The supplemental investigation of the sinking of Indianapolis convenes in Snyder’s DC offices. 

• Snyder ticked off examples: •Guam failed to provide escort, although they had information of active submarine operations in the area to be traversed. • Guam failed to take action on a Fleet Radio Unit Pacific intelligence coup, which indicated a Japanese submarine had sunk a vessel in the vicinity in which the Indianapolis was known to be. • At Leyte, the Philippine Sea Frontier organization failed to keep track of the Indianapolis and take action when that vessel failed to appear after a scheduled time, even though it was known to them through Fleet Radio Unit Pacific activities and other intelligence reports that submarines were operating in the area where the Indianapolis was and that a report of a sinking had been made by a Japanese submarine. 

• Goodwin’s info made clear to Van Metre that Nimitz’s intelligence staff had the information of a reported sinking by July 30 at 4:46 p.m. local time, in the area where the ship went down. At this time, the men of the Indianapolis had been in the water for less than one day. ~10h later, news that a sinking had occurred reached the offices of Admiral King. That occurred the day Indy was supposed to arrive in Leyte, July 31—two days before rescue began…In plain English, Nimitz’s combat intelligence staff, as well as King’s own, had clues that Indianapolis was down within hours of the event…Someone, Snyder or Van Metre perhaps, created a chart in pencil showing just how high up the food chain these interrogations would go: At Pearl Harbor: Rear Admiral McCormick and Commodore E. E. Stone, Nimitz’s assistant COS for communications. At Guam: VADM Murray, commander of the Marianas, who had sat in judgment at the court of inquiry in Guam. At Leyte: then-acting Philippine Sea Frontier commander, CMDRE Norman Gillette. At San Diego: Rear Admiral Oldendorf and CMDRE Carter, who had told McVay that all was “quiet” in the Philippine Sea. At Washington: Nimitz’s COS, the well-respected VADM Soc McMorris, and Nimitz’s combat intelligence officer, CAPT Edwin Layton. It is unclear whether Admiral King saw this penciled chart, but with Snyder’s enumeration of failures, he could have created his own. What is clear is that on the same day that King received Snyder’s memo, he revised his earlier opinion and dashed off a handwritten note to Snyder: Comment on the feasibility of bringing C.O. Indianapolis to trial now. 

• On November 30, the day after Forrestal convened the court-martial, Inspector General Snyder boiled it all down in writing for King, including the chain of intelligence failures that set conditions for the Indy disaster and that had nothing to do with McVay: • The supplemental investigation had corroborated McVay’s conclusion that the Philippine Sea was safe, as told to him by CMDRE Carter and the Guam routing office. The Guam OPS officer, CDR Lawrence, stated that he had not received any information from higher echelons and considered Route Peddie safe. • Intelligence had been received in King’s offices, and presumably in Nimitz’s and Murray’s, that there was a considerable increase in Japanese submarine activity to the west of Guam in the Philippine Sea. “It would appear,” Snyder wrote, “that the increased tempo of submarine activity in this area would have dictated a revision” of policies concerning escorts. • The hunter-killer antisubmarine operations that commenced shortly after Indy’s departure “would have appeared to have been sufficient reason” for VADM George Murray to divert Indianapolis, “but no action was taken.” • Snyder reiterated the failure of several commands to follow up on the intercept of Hashimoto’s sinking message, and to check on Indianapolis’s safety. • Both CincPac Advance (Carter’s office) and Commander Marianas (Murray’s office) failed to pass down the ULTRA intelligence showing the location of I-58 west of Guam—or if the information was too highly classified—take action themselves. Snyder’s summary then ticked off a list of culprits for the delay in reporting the loss of Indianapolis. He mentioned McCormick, Sancho, and Oldendorf, but focused particularly on CMDRE Norman Gillette at Leyte: “Although his HQ presumably had been given the intelligence of increased enemy submarine activity in the Philippine Sea, and despite the additional fact that the failure of the Indianapolis to arrive was known to his watchstanders, he took no action until after the survivors were sighted.” In addition, Snyder wrote, it might be difficult to prove that zigzagging would have improved the security of the ship, given that Carter and Murray also failed to inform McVay of the increased tempo of Japanese submarine operations. Snyder’s memo, the fruit of his long familiarity with the facts of the case, might have been all CAPT Cady needed to successfully defend Captain McVay. But the memo was addressed only to Admiral King, and its admissions of the culpability of still other admirals would remain a matter of private correspondence. 

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Court Martial (Nov- Dec, 1945)

• The court martials JAG, Colclough, presented a litany of charges to Forrestal: Failure to ensure that the communication department was maintained in a proper condition of readiness for emergency transmission. But radioman J. J. Moran’s testimony before Van Metre and Coney revealed that the radio rooms were modernized at Mare Island, properly tested, and that McVay’s radiomen were both experienced and proficient. Failure to keep a sufficient lookout for enemy submarines. But testimony by Chief Gunner Harrison and others showed that all watch stations were properly manned. Failure to issue and cause to be effected orders needed to maintain watertight integrity. But Indianapolis had been sailing in Yoke Modified, a cruising condition common to ships of her class. There were other potential charges, but these too conflicted with testimony and documents already in evidence. As Colclough cast about for something that would stick, it was decided that “failure to zigzag” could easily be proven since no one disputed that Indianapolis was steering a straight course when she was hit. Zigzagging, of course, had been at McVay’s discretion. But discretion is not a defense for poor judgment, which King felt McVay’s had clearly been since the 5th Fleet flagship now lay at the bottom of the sea. Colclough also zeroed in on a second charge: failure to order “abandon ship” in time. The problem with this charge was that a great deal of evidence to the contrary was provided at the court of inquiry. 

• While the machinery of the prosecution had had months to sift mountains of evidence and build its case, McVay’s JAG Cady had just 96 h to wrap his brain around it all and make an argument. 

• 4 Dec, 1945: USS Indianapolis CAPT McVay pleads “not guilty.” 

• “Negligence” implied knowledge that should have been acted on and was not, and there was no proof that McVay had such knowledge. In Gillette’s testimony before Coney and Van Metre, though, was ample proof that others had such knowledge and did not share it with McVay. 

• The admirals still taking their turns before Coney and Van Metre across the base were busy blaming each other. Gillette said it would have been Guam’s responsibility to divert Indianapolis. Murray said Indy had passed into Leyte’s jurisdiction—this, though he later said that “technically,” the ship was still in his area. Murray also averred that he did not know about the four submarines of the Tamon group, though Commodore Carter’s combat intel officer, Captain Layton, said Murray had that information. Neither was Murray informed of the Wild Hunter sighting and Harris’s antisubmarine operation, he said. Murray suggested that McVay’s lack of information was his own fault. 

• Without Hashimoto’s testimony, the cause of the sinking was inconclusive. Without the sinking, “hazarding” could not definitively be proved. And without hazarding, the rest of the charges against McVay might have collapsed for lack of foundation…Bower couldn’t believe that the USN had dragged a representative of America’s defeated enemy to testify against a well-known and decorated naval officer. 

• McVay’s career was ruined. He would never again serve in command. Instead, he was assigned as CoS to the commandant of the 8th Naval District in New Orleans, where he served his remaining time in uniform. In June 1949, in conjunction with his retirement at the age of 50, McVay was promoted to Rear Admiral. This “tombstone promotion,” the military equivalent of a gold watch and a swift kick out the door, occurred four months before McVay’s father died. The old man’s son had finally been awarded a star. 

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Aftermath

• 30-31 Jul, 1960: USS Indianapolis survivors hold their first reunion on the 15th anniversary of the sinking. 

• 1230, 6 Nov, 1968: Dressed in his usual uniform of a pressed khaki shirt and matching pants. McVay walked out the front door of his home on Winvian Farm in Litchfield, CT, sat down on a stone step, put a .38 revolver to his temple, and pulled the trigger. 

• McVay was not the only Indianapolis survivor to end his own life. At least a dozen more committed suicide within a few years after the sinking. 

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Exoneration

• The man who finally persuaded VA Senator Warner was the same one who sank Indianapolis. In November 1999, Mochitsura Hashimoto wrote a letter to Warner. The letter expressed Hashimoto’s dismay over the fact that McVay was ever tried in court. I have met many of your brave men who survived the sinking of the Indianapolis. I would like to join them in urging that your national legislature clear their captain’s name. Our peoples have forgiven each other for that terrible war and its consequences. Perhaps it is time your peoples forgave Captain McVay for the humiliation of his unjust conviction…For Warner, it was the final weight on the scale. He decided to take the exoneration resolution to the Senate floor. On October 12, 2000, the measure passed…Secretary England then directed the CNO to enter the following language into McVay’s record: 1. in light of the remission by the Secretary of the Navy of the sentence of the court-martial and the restoration of Captain McVay to active duty by the CNO, Fleet Admiral Chester Nimitz, that the American people should now recognize Captain McVay’s lack of culpability for the tragic loss of the USS Indianapolis and the lives of the men who died as a result of the sinking of that vessel; and 2. in light of the fact that certain exculpatory information was not available to the court-martial board and that Captain McVay’s conviction resulted therefrom, that Captain McVay’s military record should now reflect that he is exonerated for the loss of the USS Indianapolis and so many of her crew. 

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Discovery

• The bow, ultimately separated as a result of Commander Hashimoto’s torpedo attack, had crashed into the seafloor more than a mile northeast of the rest of the hull. The main portion of the hull sat on the sea bottom, pointed to the southeast. Remarkably, the main part of the ship rested upright on the seafloor in a crater of its own making, hundreds of feet wide, surrounded by a spiderweb of giant cracks that look exactly as though Indy had slammed into a windshield.

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Misc Quotes

“I joined the Navy to see the world. Since we were too busy fighting a war, I didn’t see the world.”-Bunai, USS Indianapolis Sailor. 

“Many of the Japanese Empire’s pilots were fresh from flight school, some still in their teens. (Ugaki’s) recruits were presented with the kamikaze concept, given forms to sign, and offered a choice: They could sign their names either next to the word “eager” or next to the words “very eager.” Some signed out of bravado, but others felt forced, some by peer pressure and some by ancient national traditions such as honor and love of country and family.”

“The vigor men feel when they take hold of their own destinies.”

“In our democracy, the military leader’s authority over his troops is linked to a parallel responsibility to them as fellow citizens. Accountability is a severe standard: the commander is responsible for everything that occurs under his command.”

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People

• Admiral Yamamoto: A brilliant strategist who put the full force of his intellect behind Pearl Harbor. Having spent two years in DC as a naval attaché, he knew the US Navy well and once called it “a dagger pointed at our throat.” To counter that threat, Yamamoto engineered the surprise attack at Pearl Harbor. But the admiral would not live out the war. In April 1943, US intel received detailed information about his flight plans. Yamamoto would be aboard one of two planes departing Rabaul, New Guinea, on the morning of 18 Apr. Ugaki would be on the other. At 0730, 16x American P-38 Lightning fighters intercepted the Japanese planes and shot both down. Yamamoto was killed, a small vengeance for Pearl Harbor. Ugaki, wounded but alive, vowed vengeance for his commander and friend.

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Terminology

• Alsos Mission: A WWII US Army mission to Identify the ground truth about the state of German atomic science and track down every gram of fissionable material on the European continent. 

• Change of Operational Command (CHOP). 

• FOX Schedule: A series of encrypted messages and orders broadcast directly from HQ to US ships at sea in WWII. 

• Judy: A WWII Japanese dive-bomber. 

• Kaiten: A Japanese WWII manned suicide torpedo. 

• Long Range Navigation (LORAN) Position. 

• Material Condition Affirm: A ship completely buttoned up, with maximum watertight integrity.

• Pelorus: An instrument used to observe a target’s bearing from the ship. 

• Plan of Intended Movement (PIM). 

• Spruance Haircut: Total destruction, destroy, burn, and lay low everything in sight. 

• Women Accepted for Volunteer Emergency Service (WAVES). 

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Chronology

• 19 Aug, 2017: Microsoft cofounder Paul Allen and his team discover the wreck of the USS Indianapolis at a depth of 5500m.-Indianapolis by Vincent.

• 14 Aug, 1945: Japanese Emperor Hirohito declares an end to the war, telling his war council- “If we continue the war, Japan will be altogether destroyed. Although some of you are of the opinion that we cannot completely trust the Allies, I believe that an immediate and peaceful end to the war is preferable to seeing Japan annihilated.”-Indianapolis by Vincent.

• 10 Aug, 1945: Japan’s war cabinet agrees to accept the Potsdam Declaration, but with the caveat that the emperor was to remain sovereign. In response, Truman orders continued bombing runs over military targets. For days, Hirohito’s advisors are again deadlocked, this time on new terms for surrender.-Indianapolis by Vincent.

• 1058, 9 Aug, 1945: The Tinian based Bockscar, a US Army Air Corps B-29 drops the 21-kt Pu-239 weapon dubbed Fat Man, on the city of Nagasaki. Some 40-75K people on the ground perish. The decision to use the second bomb had been made two days before at Guam.-Indianapolis by Vincent.

• On the night of August 9, with Nagasaki still burning, the Big Six of the Japanese Supreme War Council convened for their third meeting of the day. A bright line still divided those who would accept peace and those who favored fighting on. Worse, the council was deadlocked, with three members dug in firmly on each side. Ending the war would require, if not unanimity, at least consensus on the council—more hawks would have to agree with the doves. PM Suzuki and Foreign Minister Togo knew what had to be done. They would have to break historical precedent and involve the emperor. Members of this council had recently reigned unopposed over much of the Pacific. This night, they met deep under the imperial palace in a bomb shelter that was sweltering and claustrophobic. At ten minutes to midnight, the emperor appeared, ready to determine the fate of Japan…After reading the Potsdam Declaration aloud, Suzuki summarized the two prior meetings that had also resulted in deadlock. He then apologized to the emperor for requesting his presence. But with the council in stalemate and even Suzuki’s cabinet divided three ways on surrender, it was necessary, the PM said. Breaking with centuries of protocol, Suzuki asked the emperor to weigh in. Hirohito absorbed all this quietly. Then, after a long, painful stillness, the council listened in devastated silence as their sovereign spoke the unthinkable. “Continuing the war can only result in the annihilation of the Japanese people and a prolongation of the suffering of all humanity,” the monarch said, his voice soft and controlled. “It seems obvious that the nation is no longer able to wage war, and its ability to defend its own shores is doubtful. That is unbearable for me. The time has come to bear the unbearable. I give my sanction to the proposal to accept the Allied proclamation on the basis outlined by the foreign minister.”-Indianapolis by Vincent. 

• 9 Aug, 1945: The USSR joins the War in the Pacific against Japan.-Indianapolis by Vincent.

• 0915, 6 Aug, 1945: The Enola Gay, A US Army Air Corps B-29 drops the gun-type U-235 atomic bomb on Hiroshima.  On the ground below, as many as 140,000 die.-Indianapolis by Vincent.

• The Japanese Army released an underwhelming communiqué stating that Hiroshima was attacked by “a small number of B-29s” causing “considerable damage” and that “a new type of bomb” had been used. Details, the communiqué said, were now under investigation. The Japanese government took no other action except to send a fact-finding team to Hiroshima, and to delay any further response to the previously ignored Allied surrender terms issued at Potsdam until the team returned.-Indianapolis by Vincent.

• 16-hrs after the blast, POTUS Truman released a statement from the White House that removed all doubt about what had happened. “It is an atomic bomb, It is a harnessing of the basic power of the universe. The force from which the sun draws its power has been loosed against those who brought war to the Far East.”-Indianapolis by Vincent.

• In view of the Americans’ new weapon, Foreign Minister Togo urged Emperor Hirohito to accept the terms of the Potsdam Declaration. The emperor agreed. The tragedy of Hiroshima must not be repeated, he said. Togo was to tell the PM, Suzuki, that he must find a way to terminate the war without delay. Suzuki called an emergency meeting of the Supreme War Council, which included the top leaders of Japan’s military, but was told that the council had “more pressing business” to attend to. The Army, long opposed to surrender, then busied itself with suppressing the news seeping in from Western sources that the Allies had, with Potsdam, offered the opportunity to surrender. Through a combination of news censorship and government propaganda, many Japanese citizens believed that although they were starving and living in constant fear of the ominous shadow of B-29s, their nation was still on the verge of victory.-Indianapolis by Vincent.

• 1 Aug, 1945: US Army Air Corps B-29’s drop ~1M leaflets over 35 cities, warning civilians to evacuate areas scheduled for bombing within the next few days. The names of targeted cities appeared in Japanese writing under a picture of five airborne B-29s releasing bombs. Before the war’s climax, US planes would drop 63M leaflets over the country. But even after Hiroshima, the Japanese military portrayed them all as propaganda and warned its citizens that anyone caught in possession of these enemy lies was subject to arrest.-Indianapolis by Vincent.

• ~0010, 30 Jul, 1945: The USS Indianapolis, traveling at 12kts on course 260 enroute Luzon from Guam, is struck by two Type 95 torpedoes fired from IJN I-58 submarine at range 3000yds commanded by Hashimoto on Route Peddie. Hashimoto’s first torpedo rams Indy’s starboard bow just below the forward 20 mm antiaircraft guns, igniting the aviation fuel stores and incinerating or severely burning anyone belowdecks in the forward part of the ship. The blast rips away between frames 12 and 13, the bow clung to the keel of the ship like a hangnail, held there by only a few threads of hull plating. Two seconds later, the second torpedo explodes below the waterline near frame 45, missing Indy’s armory belt by just a few frames. The twin blasts and water cavity effects rupture the hull, tears open the thin outer strakes, and opens the ship to the sea. With the bow sheared off, and the propellers still pushing the ship forward, the honeycomb of exposed passageways and compartments funneled the sea into the interior of the ship. A wall of seawater surged in, drowning the men immediately behind frame 12. The main and second decks continued flooding fast, and fuel oil floated atop the seawater. Only 12 minutes later, Indy sunk beneath the sea. Men were deposited in the 80-degree water some 280 miles from the nearest land singly and in groups, over one to two miles on her heading of 260 degrees with ~300-400 of the 800 or so initial survivors coalescing into one large group.-Indianapolis by Vincent.

• The sinking of Indianapolis was second only to Pearl Harbor as the Navy’s greatest loss in World War II. In total, 67 officers and 812 enlisted men (879 total) were reported MIA.-Indianapolis by Vincent.

• 2-3 Aug, 1945: Several American military planes and aircraft rescue 316 survivors of the USS Indianapolis after four days at sea. At the time it was struck, the USS Indianapolis was carrying 1195 sailors, of which ~900 survived the attack. After 4 days at sea, only 316 were rescued, the rest succumbing to exposure, dehydration, delirium, and shark attacks.-Indianapolis by Vincent.

• 2 Aug, 1945: Survivors of the USS Indianapolis are first noticed during a routine air patrol. The aircraft, a PV-1 Ventura bomber commanded by LT Wilbur “Chuck” Gwinn, spots the survivors by chance after noticing an oil slick while on a routine antisubmarine patrol mission.-Indianapolis by Vincent.

• A crew member asked Hashimoto whether, once back on the surface, he would allow the crew to attack any enemy survivors. “No,” Hashimoto replied. “We have already done our job.”-Indianapolis by Vincent.

• 17 Jul- 2 Aug, 1945: Potsdam; WWII allied leaders attends the Potsdam Summit in Potsdam, Germany. The summit had multiple aims, including establishing goals for the demilitarization, democratization, and denazification of Germany; defining the borders and governance of Poland; and hammering out a postwar working relationship between the “Big Three”- the USSR, the US, and the UK. In addition, Churchill, Truman, and Stalin would discuss surrender terms for Japan.-Indianapolis by Vincent.

• 26 Jul, 1945: The Allies issue the Potsdam Declaration which dictates the terms for Japan’s surrender. The document, which vowed “prompt and utter destruction” if the Empire did not immediately accept the terms, was a high point for Churchill amid a crushing low. At home in England, voters had lofted the Labour Party to power, and Churchill’s deputy, Clement Attlee, was installed as PM. Churchill’s defeat would be catastrophically misread by Japan. Leaders there saw it as a weakening in the Allies’ united front, a softened beachhead upon which dissent might gain ground. Foreign affairs minister Shigenori Togo banked heavily on such an outcome as he considered the Potsdam Declaration and prepared the Empire’s response. In response, Japan decided not to release a position. Instead, PM Suzuki and Foreign Minister Togo of Japan agreed that the Empire would “mokusatsu” the declaration, which meant to “remain in wise and masterly inactivity,” or to “treat with silent contempt.”-Indianapolis by Vincent.

• 7 Apr, 1945: USN forces sink the IJN Battleship Yamato. Her death marked the worldwide end of the battleship era—and also of Japanese surface resistance in the Pacific war. In Tokyo, Emperor Hirohito heard the news, and for him, Yamato’s defeat signaled the futility of pressing on with the war. His generals, however, did not agree. They would fight to the death, even if it meant arming schoolgirls with bamboo spears. The next day, Hirohito secretly charged his new PM, Admiral Kantaro Suzuki, with a new mission: find acceptable means of ending the war. Any means short of outright surrender.-Indianapolis by Vincent.

• Apr, 1945: The USSR informs Japan they would not be renewing the neutrality pact the two nations had signed in 1941.-Indianapolis by Vincent.

• 26-28 Mar, 1945: The US Army 77th Div led by MGEN Andrew Bruce lands on and secures the Kerama Islands. In ten coordinated attacks, > 300 enemy planes, dove on the American fleet in a single day, the largest coordinated suicide attack of the war.-Indianapolis by Vincent.

• Mar, 1945: The US Army Air Corps conducts a devastating B-29 firebombing raid on Tokyo, destroying 16 sqmi and killing between 80,000-130,000 people.-Indianapolis by Vincent.

• 24 Jul- 1 Aug, 1944: The Battle of Tinian; 41K US troops, mostly marines, storm Tinian, and defeat a defending Japanese garrison of 8,500. After eight days of fighting, only 313 Japanese soldiers survived.-Indianapolis by Vincent.

• 15 Jun- 9 Jul, 1944: US forces invade the Japanese held island of Saipan, losing 11,000 of 71,000 ground troops.-Indianapolis by Vincent.

• 0730, 18 Apr, 1943: 16x American P-38’s intercept and shoot down two IJN planes after they depart Rabaul, New Guinea, killing Admiral Yamamoto and wounding Admiral Ugaki.-Indianapolis by Vincent.

• 10 Dec, 1941: 5,000 Japanese soldiers storm Guam, sweeping away a garrison of 400 US soldiers- the first American-held territory to fall to Japan.-Indianapolis by Vincent.

• 7 Dec, 1941: >350 fighter-bombers from six Japanese carriers storm Pearl Harbor.-Indianapolis by Vincent.

• 1939: Dr. Otto Hahn of Germany’s Kaiser Wilhelm Institute bombards U with neutrons, achieving the first laboratory example of fission.-Indianapolis by Vincent.

• 1936: POTUS FDR leads the “Good Neighbor” cruise aboard the USS Indianapolis to South America.-Indianapolis by Vincent.

• 1933: Szilard first develops the idea of the nuclear chain reaction and, with Albert Einstein, encourages the US to build an atomic weapon.-Indianapolis by Vincent.

• 1932: The USS Indianapolis is christened, parting the sea for the first time.-Indianapolis by Vincent.

• 1926: The USC authorizes the formation of carrier air groups.-Indianapolis by Vincent. 

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