Masters of War by Handel
Ref: Michael Handel (2000). Masters of War: Classical Strategic Thought, 3rd Edition. Routledge.
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Summary
Sun Tzu and Carl hold similar views on the primacy of politics in war; the need to preserve the professional autonomy of the military in action; the overall importance of numerical superiority; and the folly of not securing victory as rapidly and decisively as possible once war has become inevitable.
The main points on which Sun Tzu and Carl disagree concern the value of intelligence, the utility of deception, the feasibility of surprise attack, and the possibility of reliably forecasting and controlling the course of events on the battlefield.
Carl leads the reader though a torturous-though rewarding- reasoning process. Sun Tzu, for the most part presents the reader with his conclusions.
Carl systematically develops his most creative and original insights into the nature of war (such as the primacy of rational, political cost/benefit calculations; the value of setting objectives and estimating the national resources to be invested; the concepts of friction and chance; and the dominant role of uncertainty (that is, lack of information and intelligence). Carl's most important ideas and concepts on war: The difference between the attack and defense, the influence of human nature, the role of imperfect knowledge or poor intelligence, the probabilistic character of war, and ultimately, war's political nature.
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Waging War
Carl places a narrow emphasis on the use of military means; other non-military means are recognized, but they are not the concern of the military leader. For Sun, war is broad; including both military and non-military means (diplomatic, economic, psychological).
An offensive war requires above all a quick, irresistible decision.
Carl’s War in the Ideal
War is apolitical and has its own internal logic of escalating to the extreme.
War cannot be controlled.
War is total, fought without interruption as a zero-sum game until one side wins.
All resources and available strength are used without any calculations.
War is therefore not a rational activity.
Carl’s War in Reality
The objectives of war are determined by the political leaders of state, who also determine and calculate the costs and benefits involved.
The political leaders/authorities are in full control of the military.
Only the minimum necessary amount of resources and strength needed to win are used.
War is not always fought until one side wins.
War is frequently interrupted and not waged continuously.
War is essentially a rational activity.
Sun’s Ideal War
Wining without bloodshed or the use of force. Otherwise, the minimum necessary use of violence.
Once a war breaks out it should be brought to an end as quickly as possible.
Make rational decisions on the basis of knowing the enemy's strengths and weaknesses (good intelligence) as well as one's own strengths and weaknesses (introspection).
Extensive use of deception as a force multiplier.
Use the enemy's weaknesses and assets against him.
Weinberger Doctrine: Conditions necessary for US Military Involvement.
The vital interests of the US or its allies must be at stake.
Sufficient force should be applied to reflect unequivocally the intention of winning.
Political and military objectives must be clearly defined and continuously re-assessed to keep cause and response in synchronization.
Before committing troops, there must be a reasonable assurance of support from American Public Opinion.
Combat should be undertaken only as a last resort.
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Planning in War
Ideally, fighting is the final and, in a way, the least important, phase of a successfully implemented strategy. The process of thinking, planning, and searching for a comparative advantage- not an impulsive rush to engage the enemy- lays the groundwork for victory.
Net Assessment (Correlation of Forces): Allows policymakers or strategists to identify their comparative strategic advantages, and devise a strategy that capitalizes on their own strengths and the enemy's weaknesses.
It is imperative not to take the first step without considering the last (Sun).
If you want to overcome your enemy you must match your effort against his power of resistance (Sun).
The time which is allowed to pass unused accumulates to the credit of the defender. He reaps what he did not sow. Any omission of attack- whether from bad judgement, fear, or indolence- accrues to the defender's benefit.
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Strategy in War
The reciprocal nature of all action in war means that attempts to grasp its complexities through a static, unilaterally based concept will never succeed.
If an opponent holds the advantage in conventional warfare, one should wage a prolonged, low intensity guerrilla type of warfare. If an opponent is highly sensitive to changes in public opinion, one should try to prolong the war as much as possible. If, in modern times, for example, one's opponent has a significant advantage in fighting a high-tech war, one must search for a strategy that does not allow him to capitalize on it.
Pure Rational Decision Making (Sun).
Ideal Theory (Carl).
Mini-Max Strategy: Minimum risk, Maximum gain (Montgomery)- preferred by Sun.
Maxi-Strategy: Maximum risk, Maximum gain (Rommel)- preferred by Carl.
Sun generally favors caution and measured calculation more than reliance on the commander’s intuition.
Any laws or principles of war have only a relative validity- never an absolute one.
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Tactics in War
The maximum available force should be used from the outset to achieve decisive results in the shortest possible time (Carl).
There are times when the utmost daring is the height of wisdom (Carl).
Whenever boldness encounters timidity, it is likely to be the winner, because timidity itself implies a loss of equilibrium. Boldness will be at a disadvantage only in an encounter with deliberate caution, which may be considered bold in its own right and is certainly just as powerful and effective; but such cases are rare (Carl).
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Moral Forces in War
The role of moral factors has expanded in modern warfare (influence of real-time mass media on public opinion).
Crucial effect of non-rational factors such as morale, motivation, and intuition.
Overconfidence is the panacea of a superior technology (Carl).
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Leadership in War
Carl’s “Military Genius”
The commander must arrive at the most logical decision under the circumstances and then execute it resolutely. In Carl's words, the commander must "stand firm like a rock" once his decision has been made.
A military leader should have a temperament that lends itself to rational action under stressful conditions.
The gift of keeping calm even under the greatest stress: the ability to keep ones head at times of exceptional stress and violent emotion….Strength of character does not consists solely in having powerful feelings, but in maintaining one's balance in spite of them. Even with the violence of emotion, judgement, and principle must still function like a ship's compass (Carl).
The CDR in battle must trust his judgement and stand like a rock on which the waves break in vain (Carl).
Sun’s “Master of War” (Skillful Commander)
His (sovereigns) general, interfered with and opposed in all his enterprises, will be unable to achieve success, even if he has the requisite ability (Sun).
Sun prizes steadiness, resolution, stability, patience, and calmness, which enable a general faced with the chaos and adversity of war to make rational, calculated decisions.
Sun prefers the prudent, calculating commander rather than the one with a propensity to take greater risks.
Jomini’s General
The essential qualities for a general will always be as follows: First, a high moral courage, capable of great resolution. Secondly, A physical courage which takes no account of danger (Jomini).
Success depends on coup d'oeil (intuition) of the military genius (Carl).
Both Sun and Carl believe that in this most critical test of military leadership, the commander must combine courage and daring with reflectiveness, but the two strategists differ in emphasis: Carl, on the whole, prefers boldness to calculation, while Sun favors calculated risks.
What worries Carl most about the caliber of military leadership is the attenuation of boldness often experienced by commanders as they rise through the ranks (Carl).
It is almost always easy to determine the decisive point of a field of battle, but not so with the decisive moment; and it is precisely here that genius and experience are everything, and mere theory of little value (Jomini).
Talent and genius operate outside the rules, and theory conflicts with practice (Carl).
We often see that the most intelligent people are irresolute (Carl).
One may appeal to genius, which is above all rules; which amounts to admitting that rules are not only made for idiots, but are idiotic in themselves (Carl).
When the usual thing occurs, and a trained general staff makes such a plan as a matter of routine…when the moves themselves are made with self-styled expertise to reach their goal by devious routes and combinations; when modern armies have to separate in order to display consummate art by reuniting two weeks later at the utmost risk: we can only say we abhor this departure from the straight, simple, easy approach in order to plunge deliberately into confusion. Such idiocy becomes the more likely, the less the war is run by the Commander in Chief himself…that is, as a single activity of an individual invested with huge powers and…the more the plan as a whole is cooked up by an unrealistic general staff on the recipes of a half a dozen amateurs (Carl).
Given the same amount of intel, timidity will do a thousand times more damage in war than audacity (Carl).
The higher the military rank, the greater the degree to which activity is governed by the mind, by the intellect, by insight. Consequently, boldness, which is a quality of temperament, will tend to be held in check (Carl).
When faced with uncertainty, most commanders almost instinctively tend to prefer a worst-case analysis- that is, they prefer inaction to action. Uncertainty (poor intelligence) and human nature thus combine to create further inaction.
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Victory in War
Short, decisive wars have been won by a superior military doctrine, better planning, stronger motivation or the achievement of surprise, while prolonged wars have been won by more effective leadership, better cooperation among allies, greater actual and potential economic strength, and favorable topographical and geographical conditions.
The greatest achievement is to win without fighting, to convince the enemy's forces to yield and if possible, switch sides rather than be annihilated (Sun).
At the culminating point of victory, the victor has gone as far as he can without risking a reversal of fortune and attained the strongest possible position relative to his opponent: now he must consider the issue of war termination- how to consolidate his gains on the battlefield into political results.
Once secured, an operational advantage must be translated into a strategic and political advantage, with pressure on the operational level bringing better and quicker results at the bargaining table (Carl).
Method of Winning
The maximum concentration of force at the decisive point of engagement (Carl).
The center of gravity is the enemy's army (Carl).
Psychological warfare with extensive use of deception including non-violent methods (Sun).
The center of gravity is the enemy's will and alliance system (Sun).
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Politics in War
Be cautious of fighting a war that lacks irresolute political backing.
The political circumstances first determine the unique character of each war.
Gradual escalation and other difficulties imposed by various political constraints prevents the concentration of maximum force that is necessary from the start.
There should be a preference for political and economic sanctions to the immediate resort to war.
It is essential for key political and military leaders to understand how and why the impending war will differ from those in the past. If they fail to do so, they are unlikely to make the proper preparations, develop an optimal strategy, or wage the war effectively; and if they misconstrue the nature of the new war, these leaders are instead likely to fight the last war over again.
Force is often both necessary and the most effective method of achieving the political goals of the state (Carl).
Principle of Destruction: The shortest way to achieve one's political objectives is by the destruction of the enemy's forces in a major battle (Carl).
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Insurgencies
Insurgencies tend to overcome material disadvantages with psychological/moral advantage.
Unfortunately for the US, the North Vietnamese saw that their comparative advantage lay in a lower-intensity guerrilla war combined with political subversion.
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Misc Quotes
The enemy advances, we retreat; the enemy camps, we harass; the enemy tires, we attack; the enemy retreats, we pursue.-Mao Zedong’s 16 Character Formula.
The enemy will seize upon any evidence of a desire for peace as a manifestation of weakness- and as a sign that he holds the advantage.
Here was a small country torn by Civil War, without strategically important resources, whose main claim to American attention was its ability to serve as a breeding ground for trouble in a very volatile region of the world. There was little of a practical nature we could do to restore unity to this very troubled land.-Weinberger on Lebanon.
For in the Art of War, experience counts more than any amount of abstract truth.-Sun Tzu.
One mark of a great soldier (or Strategist) is that he fights on his own terms or fights not at all.-Sun Tzu.
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Terminology
Culminating Point of Victory/Attack: Sooner or later, every offensive will lose momentum even as it succeeds. The commander must therefore know when to stop his advance, pursuit, or exploitation of his success and move over to the defensive.
Principle of Continuity (‘ Principle of Pursuit’, ‘Exploitation of Success’, ‘Utilization of Victory’): Success must be exploited relentlessly; once one side has gained an advantage, it must press attack or follow through on operations to prevent the enemy from regrouping, thereby denying him respite or time to regain his equilibrium.
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