The Influence of Sea Power on History by Mahan

Ref: Alfred Thayer Mahan (1889). The Influence of Sea Power on History. Cambridge University Press.  

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Summary­

  • Nations are built on economics and maritime commerce is the foundation of international trade, thus, a maritime superiority is a requisite to national advancement.

  • The two requisites of a strong sea power: a wide-spread healthy commerce and a powerful navy.

  • In any operation, and under all circumstances, a decisive naval superiority is to be considered as a fundamental principle, and the basis upon which every hope of success must ultimately depend.

  • Naval strategy has indeed for its end to found, support, and increase, as well in peace as in war, the sea power of a country.

  • No land force can act decisively unless accompanied by a maritime superiority.

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Sea Power

  • The principal conditions affecting the sea power of nations may be enumerated as follows: I. Geographical Position. II. Physical Conformation, including, as connected therewith, natural productions and climate. III. Extent of Territory. IV. Number of Population. V. Character of the People. VI. Character of the Government, including therein the national institutions.

  • Agriculture, which increases the products of the earth, and manufactures, which multiply the products of man's industry; internal trade routes and regulations, by which the exchange of products from the interior to the exterior is made easier; shipping and customs regulations tending to throw the carrying-trade into French hands, and so to encourage the building of French shipping, by which the home and colonial products should be carried back and forth; colonial administration and development, by which a far-off market might be continually growing up to be monopolized by the home trade; treaties with foreign States favoring French trade, and imposts on foreign ships and products tending to break down that of rival nations,—all these means, embracing countless details, were employed to build up for France (1) Production; (2) Shipping; (3) Colonies and Markets,—in a word, sea power.

  • In these three things—production, with the necessity of exchanging products, shipping, whereby the exchange is carried on, and colonies, which facilitate and enlarge the operations of shipping and tend to protect it by multiplying points of safety—is to be found the key to much of the history, as well as of the policy, of nations bordering upon the sea.

  • The tendency to trade, involving of necessity the production of something to trade with, is the national characteristic most important to the development of sea power.

  • Where the revenues and industries of a country can be concentrated into a few treasure-ships, like the flotilla of Spanish galleons, the sinew of war may perhaps be cut by a stroke; but when its wealth is scattered in thousands of going and coming ships, when the roots of the system spread wide and far, and strike deep, it can stand many a cruel shock and lose many a goodly bough without the life being touched.

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Tactics

  • Maneuver for the advantage of the wind, not to attack, but to refuse action except on his own terms.

  • A ship was said to have the weather-gage, or "the advantage of the wind," or "to be to windward," when the wind allowed her to steer for her opponent, and did not let the latter head straight for her. The extreme case was when the wind blew direct from one to the other; but there was a large space on either side of this line to which the term "weather-gage" applied. The ships which have the greatest speed will have the weather-gage.

  • There are always two moments of greatest importance in a sea-fight; one which determines the method of the main attack, the other the bringing up and directing the effort of the reserve.

  • In a sea war, as in all others, two things are from the first essential,—a suitable base upon the frontier, in this case the seaboard, from which the operations start, and an organized military force, in this case a fleet, of size and quality adequate to the proposed operations.

  • Frustrate the designs of the enemy, by getting first to sea, taking positions skillfully, anticipating their combinations by greater quickness of movement, harassing their communications with their objectives, and meeting the principal divisions of the enemy with superior forces.

  • Tenacity of purpose and untiring energy in execution can repair a first mistake and baffle deeply laid plans.

  • Safety for one's self, the real object of defensive preparation, is best secured by attacking the enemy.

  • Grand Tactics: the art of making good combinations preliminary to battles as well as during their progress.

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Communications (Logistics)

  • A perfect line of communications required, as has been said, several such harbors, properly spaced, adequately defended, and with abundant supplies. Closely connected with the last consideration is the duty of strengthening, by fortification and otherwise, the vital points to which the communications led, so that these points should not depend in any way upon the fleet for protection, but only for supplies and reinforcements, and those at reasonable intervals.

  • These combinations of strong points at home and abroad, and the condition of the communications between them, may be called the strategic features of the general military situation, by which, and by the relative strength of the opposing fleets, the nature of the operations must be determined.

  • There must be reasonably secure communication, which will depend upon military control of the intervening sea. This control must be exercised by the navy, which will enforce it either by clearing the sea in all directions of hostile cruisers, thus allowing the ships of its own nation to pass with reasonable security, or by accompanying in force (convoying) each train of supply-ships necessary for the support of the distant operations.

  • Assuming that the navies, as the guardians of the communications, were the controlling factors in the war, and that the source, both of the navies and of those streams of supplies which are called communications, was in the mother-countries, and there centralized in the chief arsenals, two things follow: First, the main effort of the Power standing on the defensive, of Great Britain, should have been concentrated before those arsenals; and secondly, in order to such concentration, the lines of communication abroad should not have been needlessly extended, so as to increase beyond the strictest necessity the detachments to guard them.

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American Revolution

  • In North America the local bases of the war at its outbreak were New York, Narragansett Bay, and Boston.

  • The principal local bases of the war in the West Indies are already known through the previous narrative. They were for the English, Barbados, Sta. Lucia, and to a less degree Antigua.

  • The allies held, in the first order of importance, Fort Royal in Martinique, and Havana; in the second order, Guadeloupe and Cap François.

  • The alliance with France, and subsequently with Spain, brought to the Americans that which they above all needed,—a sea power to counterbalance that of England.

  • The evacuating Rhode Island was the most fatal measure that could possibly be adopted. It gave up the best and noblest harbor in America, from whence squadrons, in forty-eight hours, could blockade the three capital cities of America, namely, Boston, New York, and Philadelphia.-Rodney.

  • Next to a loan of money, a constant naval superiority upon these coasts is the object most interesting. This would instantly reduce the enemy to a difficult defensive.... Indeed, it is not to be conceived how they could subsist a large force in this country, if we had the command of the seas to interrupt the regular transmission of supplies from Europe. This superiority, with an aid in money, would enable us to convert the war into a vigorous offensive. With respect to us it seems to be one of two deciding points.

  • The ultimate crushing of the Americans, too, not by direct military effort but by exhaustion, was probable, if England were left unmolested to strangle their commerce and industries with her overwhelming naval strength.

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Misc Quotes

  • The character of the Dutch is such that, unless danger stares them in the face, they are indisposed to lay out money for their own defense.

  • War has such principles; their existence is detected by the study of the past, which reveals them in successes and in failures, the same from age to age.

  • The surest means in my opinion to conquer the English is to attack them in their commerce.-Lamotte-Picquet.

  • Guerre de course: commerce-destroying.

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Chronology

  • 20 Jan, 1783: The Treaty of Versailles is signed officially ending the American Revolutionary War.-Influence of Sea Power by Mahan.

  • 28 Sep- 19 Oct, 1781: The Siege of Yorktown.-Influence of Sea Power by Mahan.

    • 19 Oct, 1781: British General Charles Cornwallis surrenders his army of 8000 men to George Washington at Yorktown.  

  • 16 Aug, 1780: General Gates was totally defeated at Camden.-Influence of Sea Power by Mahan.

  • 1780: The Armed Neutrality Agreement, put forth by Russia, and signed by Sweden and Denmark- 1. Neutral vessels had a right, not only to sail to unblockaded ports, but also from port to port of a belligerent nation; in other words, to maintain the coasting trade of a belligerent. 2. That property belonging to the subjects of a power at war should be safe on board neutral vessels. This was the principle involved in the now familiar maxim, "Free ships make free goods." 3. That no articles are contraband, except arms, equipment’s, and munitions of war. This ruled out naval stores and provisions unless belonging to the government of a belligerent. 4. That blockades, to be binding, must have an adequate naval force stationed in close proximity to the blockaded port.-Influence of Sea Power by Mahan.

  • 6 Feb, 1778: The Treaty of Amity and Commerce and the Treaty of Alliance is signed between the USA and France recognizing the US as an independent nation, promoting trade, and creating a military alliance against the British.-Influence of Sea Power by Mahan.

  • 1778: The War of 1778 is fought between Great Britain and the House of Bourbon.-Influence of Sea Power by Mahan.

  • 1701-1714: The War of the Spanish Succession.-Influence of Sea Power by Mahan.

    • 11 Apr, 1713- Feb, 1715: The Treaties/Peace of Utrecht are passed ending the War of the Spanish Succession; the Netherlands (which included Belgium) was passed from Spain to Austria.

  • 1651: The Navigation Acts are passed by England under Cromwell and designed to restrict England’s trade to English ships framed to encourage the development of English shipping so that adequate auxiliary vessels would be available in times of war.-Influence of Sea Power by Mahan.

  • 1648: The Dutch close the Scheldt River to sea commerce as a condition of peace; this closed the harbor of Antwerp and transferred the sea trade of Belgium to Holland.-Influence of Sea Power by Mahan.

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