On War by Clausewitz

Ref: Carl Von Clausewitz (1832). On War.

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Summary­

  • On War (Von Kriege): A book on war and military strategy by Prussian General Carl von Clausewitz (1780-1831), written after the Napoleonic Wars, from 1816-1830, and published posthumously by his wife Marie von Brühl in 1832.

  • Major Theories

    • The Dialectic approach to Military Analysis.

    • Methods of Critical Analysis of War.

    • War as “Politics by other means.”

    • The asymmetrical relationship between attack and defense.

    • The nature of Military Genius.

    • The trinity of War- the Government, Military, and People.

    • Distinction between Absolute War, Ideal War, and Real War- “War tends to the absolute.”

    • Strategy belongs primarily to the realm of art, but is constrained by quantitative analyses of political benefits vs. military costs and losses. Tactics belongs primarily to the realm of science.

    • The importance of Moral Forces as opposed to quantifiable physical elements.

    • The Fog of War- the essential unpredictability of war.

    • Friction- the disparity between the ideal performance of units, organizations or systems, and their actual real-world performance.

    • Strategic and Operational Centers of Gravity.

    • The Culminating point of the offensive and the culminating point of victory.

  • Principles of War: Objective, Offensive, Mass, Economic of Force, Maneuver, Unity of Command, Security, Surprise, Simplicity.

  • Moral Forces: Elements that make up the climate of war: danger, exertion, uncertainty, and chance.

  • Book I: On the Nature of Warfare

  • Book II: On the Theory of Warfare

  • Book III: Of Strategy in General

  • Book IV: The Combat

  • Book V: Military Forces

  • Book VI: Defence

  • Book VII: The Attack

  • Book VIII: Plan of War

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---Book 1: War---

  • 1st Thesis: War is an act of force, and there is no logical limit to the application of that force. Each side, therefore, compels its opponent to follow suit; a reciprocal action is started which must lead, in theory, to extremes.

  • 2nd Thesis: So long as I have not overthrown my opponent, I am bound to fear he may overthrow me. Thus, I am not in control: he dictates to me as much as I dictate to him.

  • 3rd Thesis: Each opponent measures the power and resolve of the other. Competition causes both forces to increase.

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What is War?

War: An act of force to compel our enemy to do our will. A Dual on a larger scale meant to achieve a political purpose led by officers whose effectiveness rests as much on aristocratic self-esteem as on professional expertise.

  • There are two distinct forms of action in war: attack and defense.

  • War often is nothing more than armed neutrality, a threatening attitude meant to support negotiations, a mild attempt to gain some small advantage before sitting back and letting matters take their course, or a disagreeable obligation imposed by an alliance, to be discharged with as little effort as possible.

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War as Politics

  • Do political relations between peoples and governments stop when diplomatic notes are no longer exchanged? Is war not just another expression of their thoughts, another form of speech or writing? Its grammar, indeed, may be its own, but not its logic.

  • All wars can be considered acts of policy. The political object is the goal, war is the means of reaching it, and means can never be considered in isolation from their purpose.

  • War should never be thought of as something autonomous but always as an instrument of policy.

  • Since war is not an act of senseless passion but is controlled by its political object, the value of this object must determine the sacrifices to be made for it in magnitude and also in duration. Once the expenditure of effort exceeds the value of the political object, the object must be renounced and peace must follow.

  • In the same way as a man who has not fully mastered a foreign language sometimes fails to express himself correctly, so statesmen often issue orders that defeat the purpose they are meant to serve. Time and again that has happened, which demonstrates that a certain grasp of military affairs is vital for those in charge of general policy.

  • Trinity: The people, the commander and his army, the government. The passions that are to be kindled in war must already be inherent in the people; the scope which the play of courage and talent will enjoy in the realm of probability and chance depends on the particular character of the commander and the army; but the political aims are the business of government alone. These three tendencies are like three different codes of law, deep-rooted in their subject and yet variable in their relationship to one another.

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Aim of War

  • You must overcome the enemy or disarm him.

  • Put the enemy in a situation that is ever more unpleasant than the sacrifice you call on him to make.

  • You must overcome both your enemy's total means and his strength of will (resolve).

  • Inability to carry on the struggle can, in practice, be replaced by two other grounds for making peace: the first is the improbability of victory; the second is its unacceptable cost.

  • Wearing down the enemy in conflict means using the duration of the war to bring about a gradual exhaustion of his physical and moral resistance.

  • The fighting forces must be destroyed: that is, they must be put in such a condition that they can no longer carry on the fight…The country must be occupied; otherwise, the enemy could raise fresh military forces….both these things may be done and the war, that is the animosity and the reciprocal effects of hostile elements, cannot be considered to have ended so long as the enemy's will has not been broken. You could expand on this to say that you have to destroy one of the three pegs (because war is a slow political process).

    • 1: The will of the people.

    • 2: The physical army and their ability to fight.

    • 3: The nation's political objectives.

  • Of all the possible aims in war, the destruction of enemy's armed forces always appears as the highest.

  • No one starts a war- or rather, no one in his senses ought to do so- without first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that war and how he intends to conduct it.

  • Even the most ambitious ruler has no greater aims than to gain a number of advantages that could be exploited at the peace conference.

  • The object of military activity can only be one of two kinds: seizing a small or larger piece of enemy territory, or holding one's own until things take a better turn.

  • It is always more important to preserve, or, as the case may be, destroy armed forces than hold on to territory.

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Defeat

  • The defeated state often considers the outcome merely as a transitory evil.

  • Defeat of the enemy:

    • Destruction of his army.

    • Seizure of his capital.

    • Delivery of an effective blow against his principal ally.

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Attack & Defense

  • There can be no war if both parties seek to defend themselves. The aggressor has a positive aim, while the defenders aim is merely negative.

  • Immobility and Inactivity are the normal state of armies in war, and action is the exception.

  • Any kind of interruption, pause, or suspension of activity is inconsistent with the nature of offensive war.

  • Defense is stronger but moral forces may allow the offensive to overcome the advantage of the defense.

  • Attack: A positive action in warfare.

    • If the attacker sustains his efforts while opponent does nothing but ward them off, the latter can do nothing to neutralize the danger that sooner or later an offensive thrust will succeed.

    • A convergent attack always holds out promise of increased results, for if it succeeds the enemy is not just beaten; he is virtually cut off.

  • Defense: A negative action in warfare.

    • The superiority of the defensive is very great, far greater than appears at first sight.

    • Elements of Defense: Militia, Fortress, People, People in Arms, Allies.

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Moral Forces

  • Material disparity cannot go beyond the amount that moral factors could replace.

  • Military Spirit: One of the most important moral elements in war; comes from two interacting sources- victory in war and frequent exertions of the army to the utmost limits of its strength.

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Military Genius

  • The ardor of (a leaders) spirit must rekindle the flame of purpose in all others; his inward fire must revive their hope. Only to the extent that he can do this will he retain his hold on his men and keep control. Once that hold is lost, once his own courage can no longer revive the courage of his men, the mass will draw him down to the brutish world where danger is shirked and shame is unknown.

  • The man of action must at times trust in the sensitive instinct of judgement, derived from his native intelligence and developed through reflection, which almost unconsciously hits on the right course.

  • Truth in itself is rarely sufficient to make men act. The most powerful springs of action in men lie in emotions. He derives his most vigorous support from that blend of brains and temperament which we have learned to recognize in the qualities of determination, firmness, staunchness, and strength of character.

  • If we then ask what sort of mind is likeliest to display the qualities of military genius, experience and observation will both tell us that it is the inquiring rather than the creative mind, the comprehensive rather than the specialized approach, the calm rather than the excitable head to which in war we would choose to entrust the fate of our brothers and children, and the safety and honor of our country.

 

  • Indispensable Qualities

    • Courage: The highest of all moral qualities in times of danger, therefore, courage is the soldier's 1st requirement. Courage is of two kinds:

      • Courage in the face of personal danger. It may be indifference to danger which could be due to the individual’s constitution, or to his holding life cheap, or to habit. In any case, it must be regarded as a permanent condition. Alternatively, courage may result from such positive motives as ambition, patriotism, or enthusiasm of any kind. In that case courage is a feeling, an emotion, not a permanent state. These two kinds of courage act in different ways. The first is the more dependable; having become second nature, it will never fail. The other will often achieve more. There is more reliability in the first kind, more boldness in the second. The first leaves the mind calmer; the second tends to stimulate, but it can also blind. The highest kind of courage is a compound of both.

      • Courage to accept responsibility, either before the tribunal of some outside power or before the court of one's own conscience.

    • Self-Confidence.

    • Coup D’oeil: An intellect that, even in the darkest hour, retains glimmerings of the inner light which leads to truth.

    • Determination: The courage to follow this faint light wherever it may lead.

      • Some may bring the keenest brains to the most formidable problems, and may possess the courage to accept serious responsibilities; but when faced with a difficult situation they still find themselves unable to reach a decision. Their courage and their intellect work in separate compartments, not together; determination therefore does not result.

      • Great strength is not easily produced where there is no emotion.

      • Men of low intelligence cannot process determination in the sense in which we use the word. They may act without hesitation in a crisis, but if they do, they act without reflection; and a man who acts without reflection cannot be torn by doubt. From time-to-time action of this type may even be appropriate; but it is the average result that indicates the existence of military genius.

    • Self-Control: The ability to keep one's head at times of exceptional stress and violent emotion (rooted in temperament).

      • A strong character is one that will not be unbalanced by the most powerful of emotions.

      • How men differ in their reactions:

        • Stolid/Phlegmatic: Men who are extremely active, but whose feelings never rise above a certain level, men whom we know to be sensitive but calm.

        • Men whose passions are easily inflamed, in whom excitement flares up suddenly but soon burns out, like gunpowder.

        • Men who do not react to minor matters, who will be moved only very gradually, not suddenly, but whose emotions attain great strength and durability. These are the men whose passions are strong, deep, and concealed.

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Friction

  • Friction is the force that makes the apparently easy so difficult.

  • We have identified danger, physical exertion, intelligence, and friction as the elements that coalesce to form the atmosphere of war, and turn them into a medium that impedes activity. In their restrictive effects they can be grouped into a single concept of general friction. Is there any lubricant that will reduce this abrasion? Only one, and a commander and his army will not always have it readily available. Combat Experience.

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---Book 2: Theory---

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Theory of War

  • A Theory of War must include moral forces, the effect of danger, intellectual qualities, reactions, and uncertainty of information, therefore a theory of war is unattainable, as talent and genius operate outside the rules, and theory conflicts with practice.

  • Theory should cast a steady light on all phenomena so that we can more easily recognize and eliminate the weeds that always spring from ignorance; it should show how one thing is related to another, and keep the important and the unimportant separate. If concepts combine of their own accord to form that nucleus of truth we call a principle, if they spontaneously compose a pattern that becomes a rule, it is the task of the theorist to make this clear.

  • Theory demands that at the outset of a war its character and scope should be determined on the basis of the political probabilities.

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Critical Analysis

  • Critical Analysis: The application of theoretical truths to actual events; requires research, tracing effect to cause, and criticism- the investigation & evaluation of means employed.

  • Nowhere in life is deducing the links between cause and effect more difficult than in war.

  • Analysis must extend to the ultimate objective, which is to bring about peace.

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---Book 3: Strategy---

  • Apt examples are the best teachers, but one must never let a cloud of preconceived ideas get in the way; for even the rays of the sun are refracted and diffused by clouds. It is the theorists most urgent task to dissipate such preconceptions which at times form and infiltrate like a miasma. The errors intellect creates, intellect can again destroy.

  • Critics usually exclude all moral qualities from strategic theory, and only examine material factors. They reduce everything to a few mathematical formulas of equilibrium and superiority, of time and space, limited by a few angles and lines. If that were really all, it would hardly provide a scientific problem for a schoolboy.

  • Unequivocal Statements:

    • Destruction of the enemy forces is the overriding principle of war, and, so far as positive action is concerned, the principal way to achieve our objective.

    • Destruction of forces can usually be accomplished only by fighting.

    • Only major engagements involving all forces lead to major success.

    • The greatest successes are obtained where all engagements coalesce into one great battle.

    • Only in a great battle does the commander in chief control operations in person; it is only natural that he should prefer to entrust the dimension of the battle himself.

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Strategy

  • Strategic Theory: Study of engagement in terms of its possible results and of the moral and psychological forces that largely determine its course.

  • Strategic Elements

    • Moral: Forces of the intellect and psychological qualities and influences.

      • The greater the ease with which surprise is achieved, the smaller is its effectiveness, and vice versa.

      • Fatigue, exertion, and privation constitute a separate destructive factor in war.

    • Physical: The size, composition, armament, etc of the armed force.

      • Superiority of Numbers is the most important factor in the outcome of an engagement.

    • Mathematical: The angle of lines of operations, the convergent and divergent movements.

    • Geographical: The influence of terrain, such as mountains, rivers, woods, and roads.

    • Statistical: The support and maintenance of the armed force.

  • If we intend to hold out longer than our opponent, we must be content with the smallest possible objects, for obviously a major object requires more effort than a minor one. The minimum object is pure self-defense; in other words, fighting without a positive purpose.

  • Destruction of the enemy's force is only a means to an end. If a mere demonstration is enough to cause the enemy to abandon his position, the objective has been achieved; but as a rule the hill or bridge is captured only so that even more damage can be inflicted on the enemy.

  • The natural goal of all campaign plans is the turning point at which attack becomes defense.

  • Centers of Gravity (COG)

    • When preparing for a war, identify the enemies COGs and ensure that the forces to be used against those points are concentrated.

    • Reduce the source of the enemy’s strength to a single center of gravity…That is the place where the decision should be reached.

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Tactics

  • Tactics: The art of skillfully exploiting forces for a larger purpose; actual execution of force.

  • Unification of Forces in Time and Space: The simultaneous use of all means intended for a given action; an elementary law of war.

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Victory

  • Victory depends on four main factors:

    • The tactics according to which the battle is fought.

    • The terrain.

    • The composition of forces.

    • The relative strength of opposing armies.

  • Success is not due simply to general causes. Particular factors can often be decisive- details only known to those who were on the spot. There can also be more factors which never come to light; while issues can be decided by chances and incidents so minute as to figure in histories simply as anecdotes.

  • A major victory can only be obtained by positive measures aimed at a decision, never by simply waiting on events.

  • Two principles for total defeat of the enemy

    • Act with the utmost concentration (of forces).

    • Act with the utmost speed. Rapid use of forces. Initial Surprise.

  • Once a major victory is achieved there must be no talk of rest, of a breathing space, of reviewing the position or consolidating and so forth, but only of the pursuit, going for the enemy again if necessary, seizing his capital, attacking his reserves and anything else that might give his country aid and comfort.

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Branches

  • Three main branches: Infantry, Cavalry, Artillery. A combination of all three confers the greatest strength.

    • Infantry: The most dependent, yet important, arm. Dependent on the nation’s populace.

    • Cavalry: Individual Combat; the most easily dispensable arm. Dependent on the equine.

    • Artillery: Offensive and shaping; the costliest arm. Dependent on finance.

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Uprisings

  • Conditions under which a general uprising can be effective:

    • Fighting takes place in the interior of the country.

    • War is not decided by a single stroke.

    • The Theater of Operations is large.

    • National character is suited to war.

    • Country has rough and inaccessible terrain- mountains, forests, marshes, etc.

  • A general uprising should be nebulous and elusive; its resistance should never materialize as a concrete body, otherwise the enemy can direct sufficient force at its core, crush it, and take many prisoners.

  • A commander can more easily shape and direct the popular insurrection by supporting the insurgents with small units of the regular army. Without these regular troops to provide encouragement, the local inhabitants will usually lack the confidence and initiative to take to arms.

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Absolute War

  • The people became a participant in war; instead of governments and armies as heretofore, the full weight of the nation was thrown into the balance. The resources and efforts now available for use surpassed all conventional limits; nothing now impeded the vigor with which war could be waged.

  • The strength of governments (and armies) lay entirely in their treasuries.

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Misc Quotes

“Nothing is more important in life than finding the right standpoint for seeing and judging events, and then adhering to it. One point and one only yields an integrated view of all phenomena; and only by holding to that point of view can one avoid inconsistency.”

“Subtleties of logic do not motivate the human will.”

“Although our intellect always longs for clarity and certainty, our nature often finds uncertainty fascinating. It prefers to day-dream in the realms of chance and luck rather than accompany the intellect on its narrow and tortuous path of philosophical enquiry and logical deduction only to arrive- hardly knowing how- in unfamiliar surroundings where all the usual land marks seem to have disappeared. Unconfined by narrow necessity, it can revel in a wealth of possibilities; which inspire courage to take wing and dive into the element of daring and danger like a fearless swimmer into the current.”

“If a long line of communications is covered poorly or not at all, the smallest operation against it holds out promise of success.”

“Strength of Character turns to obstinacy as soon as a man resists another point of view not from superior insight or attachment to some higher principle, but because he objects instinctively. Check yourself constantly that you are not vane…or worse, obstinate.”

“Was is such a dangerous business that the mistakes which come from kindness are the worst.”

“What is most needed in the lower ranks is courage and self-sacrifice.”

“The hard-pressed army, not expecting help where none can be forthcoming, can only trust to the high morale that despair breeds in all courageous men. At that point the greatest daring, possibly allied with a bold stratagem, will seem to be the greatest wisdom.”

“At the level of the supreme commander, all solutions must be left to imaginative intellect.”

“Savage people are ruled by passion. Civilized people by the mind.”

“War without passion is war by algebra.”

“In the whole range of human activities, war most closely resembles a game of cards.”

“Reject the petty. Great things alone make a great mind.”

“Happy the army where ill-timed boldness occurs frequently; it is a luxuriant weed, but indicates the richness of the soil.”

“Boldness governed by superior intellect is the mark of a hero.”

“A people and nation can hope for a strong position in the world only if national character and familiarity with war fortify each other by continual interaction.”

“The fact that slaughter is a horrifying spectacle must make us take war more seriously, but not provide an excuse for gradually blunting our swords in the name of humanity.”

“It is the weak, those likely to need defense, who should always be armed in order not to be overwhelmed.”

“Any nation that uses (war) intelligently will, as a rule, gain some superiority over those who disdain its use.”

“Those men who habitually act, both in great and minor affairs, on particular dominating impressions or feelings rather than according to strict logic, are hardly aware of the confused, inconsistent, and ambiguous situation in which they find themselves.”

“It is legitimate to judge an event by its outcome, for this is its soundest criterion. But a judgement based on the result alone must not be passed off as evidence of human wisdom.”

“The man who sacrifices the possible in search of the impossible is a fool.”

“Truth in itself is rarely sufficient to make men act. Hence the step is always long from cognition to volition, from knowledge to ability. The most powerful springs of action in men lie in emotions. He derives his most vigorous support from that blend of brains and temperament which we have learned to recognize in the qualities of determination, firmness, staunchness, and strength of character.”

“A general in time of war is constantly bombarded by reports both true and false; by errors arising from fear or negligence or hastiness; by disobedience born of right or wrong interpretations, of ill will, of a proper or mistaken sense of duty, of laziness, or of exhaustion; and by accidents that nobody could have foreseen.”

“Theory should only be used as an aid to judgement.”

“In War, experience counts more than any amount of abstract truths.”

“In war all action is aimed at probable rather than at certain success. The degree of certainty that is lacking must in every case be left to chance, or whatever you like to call it….we should not habitually prefer the course that involves the least uncertainty. That would be an enormous mistake, as our theoretical arguments will show. There are times when the utmost daring is the height of wisdom.”

“Wherever decisions are based on fear or courage, they can no longer be judged objectively; consequently, intelligence and calculation can no longer be expected to determine the probable outcome.”

“In the soldier the natural tendency for unbridled action and outbursts of violence must be subordinated to demands of a higher kind: obedience, order, rule, and method.”

“An Army that maintains its cohesion under the most murderous fire; that cannot be shaken by imaginary fears and resists well-founded ones with all its might; that, proud of its victories, will not lose the strength to obey orders and its respect and trust for its officers even in defeat; whose physical power, like the muscles of an athlete, has been steeled by training in privation and effort; a force that regards such efforts as a means to victory rather than a curse on its cause; that is mindful of all these duties and qualities by virtue of the single powerful idea of the honor of its arms- such an army is imbued with the true military spirit.”

“The higher the military rank, the greater the degree to which activity is governed by the mind, by the intellect, by insight.”

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Terminology

  • Art: The point where perception ends and judgement begins.

  • Concentrated War: The major battle; the center of gravity of the entire conflict or campaign.

  • Critical Analysis: The application of theoretical truths to actual events.

  • Cunning: The use of a trick or stratagem that permits the intended victim to make his own mistakes, which, combined in a single result, suddenly change the nature of the situation.

  • Ehrgeiz: Greed for honor.

  • Man of Action: The man who trusts in the sensitive instinct of judgement, derived from his native intelligence and developed through reflection, which almost unconsciously hits on the right course.  

  • Reserve: An armed force reserved during a military offensive to prolong and renew action and to counter unforeseen threats. It is an essential to hold forces in reserve according to the degree of strategic uncertainty.

  • Ruhmsucht: Hankering after glory.

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Chronology

  • 1556: Abdication of Holy Roman Emperor Charles V; his kingdom broke into Spain and Austria. The latter, strengthened by Hungary and Bohemia, emerges as a major power.-On War by Clausewitz.

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