The American Way of War by Weigley

Ref: Russel Weigley (1973). The American Way of War: A history of US Military Strategy. Macmillan, NY.

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Summary­

  • How the US fought and won the American Revolutionary War.

  • The American Revolutionary Armies were never able to meet British Armies of approximately equal size on equal terms on the battlefield.

  • At best, revolutionary fervor was held by an active minority of the American population that nourished the Revolutionary Cause.

  • The war of independence was revolutionary in the very scope of the American's objective: to eliminate British power completely from the vast extent of the thirteen rebellious colonies.

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Misc Quotes

“Unless you can reasonably promise yourself a moral certainty of succeeding, I would have you by all means to relinquish the undertaking, and confine yourself, in the main, to a defensive operation.”-George Washington.

“The Americans would be less dangerous if they had a regular Army.”-Frederick Haldimand.

“The amazing advantage the Enemy derive from their ships and the command of the water, keeps us in a state of constant perplexity and the most anxious conjecture.”-George Washington.  

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American Strategy

  • Good Intel…Swift Movement. Virtues of Boldness, Unconventional, Unexpected.

  • The presence of Washington's Army had always forbidden British Forces from wide dispersal.

  • Deprive the British of their greatest asset, the command of the sea.

  • Intelligence

    • Use every means in your power to obtain a knowledge of the Enemy's numbers, Situation, and Designs.

  • Protracted Defensive War

    • The essence of Washington's Way of War: a strategy of attrition.

    • Strategic Paradox (of Washington during the Revolution): Strategic Defense v. Removing British Armies altogether from the insurgent provinces. To find a way out of the paradox, Washington's hopes had to lie mainly not in military victory but in the possibility that the political opposition in Great Britain might in time force the British Ministry to abandon the conflict.

    • Washington believed he must accept all the risks of protracted war, because American resources permitted no other way to lay the military foundation of political independence.

    • To defend not any geographical area or point but the existence of his army. He would shield the most important sections of the country as best he could, but the preservation of his army, was a higher object. Washington concluded that if the Army could be kept alive, the Revolutionary cause would also remain alive. Then in time it could be hoped that the British government would lose patience and abandon the war.

    • Washington’s conviction that to preserve the existence of his army must be his first object encouraged him in a thoroughly conventional belief that of the various principles governing warfare and strategy, the most important was the one which the twentieth century would call the "principle of concentration or mass.”

    • The Army must be kept undivided, but at the same time, and also for the army's preservation, general engagements with the enemy must be avoided, "since the idea of forcing their lines or bringing on a general engagement on their own grounds, is universally held incompatible with our interest.”

  • Guerilla Warfare against the British

    • The first, preliminary phase of a Guerilla campaign, that of scattered terrorism.

    • Few Guerilla campaigns have progressed farther than the phase of terrorist raids without the assistance of at least a semblance of an organized army.

    • It was to raids and attacks against detachments and outposts that Washington turned, a modest policy, but one which offered some satisfaction to his own and his country's aggressive impulses, and yet within the limits of the overall caution to which wisdom impelled him….Strategy of Erosion could be more accurate; to wear away the resolution of the British by gradual, persistent action against the periphery of their armies was as much of an offensive purpose as Washington could afford.

    • The Erosion of the enemy's strength by means of hit-and-run strikes against his outposts.

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British Failures

  • Clinton acted further to force a clear choice between rebellion and loyalty, when many would have preferred neutrality, by ending a system of parole for rebels and promising punishment as enemies to any South Carolinian's who failed to affirm complete loyalty.

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Chronology

  • 8 Sep, 1781: The Battle of Eutaw Spring; US General Greene attacks British General Stewart. The Rich supplies of the British camp undue him, however, for when the American's reached them, most of Greene's formation disintegrated into parties of plunderers. Thereupon Stewart counterattacked and won the field.-American Way of War by Weigley.

  • 15 Mar, 1781: The Battle of Guilford Court House; US General Greene re-crosses the Dan River and is engaged by British General Cornwallis.-American Way of War by Weigley.

    • The American's abandoned the field (at high cost to both armies). Greene could not gamble on another battle, lest even another tactical victory reduce him to impotence. He retreated to the Cape Fear River, to Wilmington, and to the ocean, where the succor of British Sea Power awaited him.-American Way of War by Weigley.

  • 17 Jan, 1781: The Battle of Cowpens; Morgan allowed Tarleton to bring him to battle at a place called the Cowpens where Morgan defeated 90% of Tarleton's force.-American Way of War by Weigley.

    • "Tarleton’s Quarter:" A byword by permitting his men to slaughter rebels who asked for quarter at the Waxhaws.-American Way of War by Weigley.

  • Fall-Winter, 1780-1781: English and American Armies “Race to the Dan River.” Across the Catawba and the Yadkin, Cornwallis pursued Greene and Morgan, whose forces reunited at Guilford Court House.-American Way of War by Weigley.

    • Cornwallis' Army arrived at the Dan worn to a frazzle, 500 men of 2500 having dropped out since Ramsour's Mills, haversacks empty, and the Carolina partisans stripping away provisions from the countryside in their rear.-American Way of War by Weigley.

    • Continental recruits and Virginia and NC militia raised Greene's numbers to about 4,300 against slightly more than 2,000 with Cornwallis. Greene decided to give battle, on the theory that he could hardly lose. If Cornwallis should win a tactical victory, he was already so far gone in exhaustion that it would probably hurt him almost as much as a defeat.-American Way of War by Weigley.

  • 16 Aug, 1780: The Battle of Camden; Gates loses to Cornwallis.-American Way of War by Weigley.

    • Following Camden, Cornwallis decided to divide his own force, keeping part of it in hand to watch Greene, while Tarleton moved westward with about half the force to deal with Morgan.-American Way of War by Weigley.

    • Greene determined to lead Cornwallis on as long a chase as possible; the Race to the Dan River begins.

  • 1780: Washington receives 5,000 French soldiers under Lieutenant General the Comte de Rochambeau.-American Way of War by Weigley.

  • 1779: Spain joins the American Revolutionary war on the American side.-American Way of War by Weigley.

  • 1778: France joins the American Revolutionary war on the American side.-American Way of War by Weigley.

  • 1778: Great Britain is fighting on Multiple Fronts and the British Army in North America receives few reinforcements.-American Way of War by Weigley.

  • 17 Oct, 1777: The Battle of Saratoga; British General Burgoyne surrenders all that remained of his army to US General Gates at Saratoga.-American Way of War by Weigley.

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